The
Einsteins of Wall Street
Jeremy Bernstein
If you decide you don’t have to get
A’s, you can learn an enormous amount in
college.
—I.I. Rabi
In the spring of 1969, I got the somewhat
lunatic idea of going to the Northwest Frontier of
Pakistan to see the high mountains—K-2, Nanga
Parbat, and the like. As it happened, I had a
Pakistani colleague in physics with a connection
to both the University of Islamabad and the Ford
Foundation. He arranged for me to become a Ford
Foundation visiting professor at the university,
and before taking up my teaching duties I managed
to explore all sorts of places on the frontier
that are now presumably inaccessible to travelers.
In Islamabad I led a pleasant but somewhat
lonely existence—until, after about a month, I
heard a pair of English-speaking voices that
turned out to belong to another Ford Foundation
professor and his wife. This was not any old
professor. It was Marshall Stone, one of the
world’s best mathematicians. In addition to
creating, at the University of Chicago, the
leading school of mathematics in the country,
Stone had also been the teacher of my teacher at
Harvard, George Mackey, who had interested me in
the mathematical foundations of quantum theory.
Now here he was, accompanied by his rather
recently acquired wife Vila, a very attractive and
voluble Yugoslavian.
The three of us spent a good deal of time
together—Stone, an inveterate traveler, had also
come to Pakistan to visit the frontier—and in the
course of it Vila mentioned that she had a
daughter in New York whom I might like to meet.
When I returned to the States, I called this young
woman. She was seeing someone at the time, but she
thought that her beau and I might have things to
talk about. He was, she said, studying
"derivatives," which in calculus refers to the
rate of change along a curve. Since this is one of
the first things one learns in calculus, I assumed
that he was a beginner, which did not seem to
promise much by way of conversation. In the event,
he turned out to be an amiable chap by the name of
Myron.
I forget what we talked about. But I do dimly
remember that at one point his girlfriend
whispered in my ear that Myron was going to win
the Nobel Prize someday. She turned out to be
right about that, although it took a while: in
1997, Myron Scholes and Robert Merton shared the
Nobel Prize in economics. Together with Fischer
Black, who had died two years earlier (and who
will come into this story later on), Scholes had
created what is known as the Black-Scholes
equation, published in 1973. Merton invented
another approach to the same problem.
The Black-Scholes equation does indeed deal
with derivatives, but in another sense: that is,
investment instruments, like options on stocks or
bonds, whose present value is "derived" from the
projected future values of the financial
commodities that underlie them. The Black-Scholes
equation, with its many adumbrations, is used to
assess the market value of such options at any
given point in time. It is the Newton’s Law, or
the Schrödinger equation, of the whole field of
financial engineering that makes these markets
operate.
I had more or less forgotten about all this
until reading a new book by Emanuel Derman called
My Life As A Quant: Reflections on Physics and
Finance.* A "quant" is the rubric used on Wall
Street and elsewhere to denote people who practice
quantitative financial analysis—financial
engineering—for which the Black-Scholes equation
is a prototype. Physics comes into Derman’s memoir
because he has a Ph.D. in physics from Columbia
and was one of the early pows (Physicists on Wall
Street), having joined the financial firm of
Goldman Sachs in 1985.
The first part of Derman’s book traces the
somewhat unlikely steps that took him from his
native Cape Town, South Africa, first to Columbia
and then via the AT&T Bell Labs and elsewhere
to Wall Street. As he notes in his book, our paths
crossed at various times. I do not have specific
memories of our meetings, but both of us are
theoretical elementary-particle physicists, and
our world is not large.
Derman arrived in New York in 1966. The physics
department at Columbia was then still under the
aegis of I.I. Rabi, whose standards were extremely
high. Apart from Rabi himself, there were other
present and future Nobel Prize winners. You had to
be very good, and very determined, to survive in
that department.
Derman, who remarks wryly that about 10 percent
of his projected life span was spent getting a
Ph.D. at Columbia, wrote his thesis on what we
refer to as "phenomenology"—deriving some
underlying theory to make a model that either
predicts or explains an experimental result. From
the sound of it, Derman’s was a very respectable
piece of work, one that incidentally required him
to learn to use the rather primitive computer
facilities that were then available. The thesis
was good enough to get him a post-doctoral
position at the University of Pennsylvania.
The next several years were difficult. Derman
moved from one temporary academic job to another,
usually in cities where he was separated from his
wife, until finally taking a position in the
business-systems center at Bell Labs in New
Jersey, to which he could commute from New York.
Although he seems to have hated Bell—his chapter
on it is called "In the Penal Colony"—in those
years the place was full of people at the top of
their fields, including Arno Penzias, Robert
Wilson, and other past and future Nobelists.†
At Bell, Derman wanted to join the research
group working on the UNIX operating system—the
multi-user, multi-task system that now runs
computer complexes around the world. But all his
requests were denied, and by the early 1980’s he
had had enough. By coincidence, this happened to
be the time when the major brokerage firms were
building up their financial-engineering
departments and were headhunting at places like
Bell.
II
The brokerage business had changed: from merely
selling stocks and bonds, it was now dealing in
all sorts of derivatives, which play an important
role in the marketplace in diversifying risk and
maintaining price stability. For example, the firm
of Salomon Brothers had put together a powerful
group of analysts under John Meriwether; one of
its consultants was Robert Merton, the Harvard
professor who would later share the Nobel Prize
with Scholes (and whose father, also Robert but
with a different middle initial, was a noted
sociologist of science at Columbia). Similarly
deep into derivatives was Goldman Sachs; it was
there, in December 1985, that Derman took a job in
the financial-strategies group and had his first
encounter with Black-Scholes.
If you put "Black-Scholes" into Google, you
will come up with something like 128,000 entries.
Most of them are technical; some, clearly by
ex-physicists, offer to tutor you for a
considerable fee. While wandering through this
jungle I came across the perfect site for my
purposes. It is called "Black-Scholes the Easy
Way," and can be found at
http://homepage.mac.com/j.norstad. The person who
put it up, John Norstad, is a computer scientist
whose notes, representing his own learning
process, are very unassuming and clear. In what
follows I will use Norstad’s examples.
In the early 80’s, as I mentioned, financial
institutions were doing a substantial business in
the sale of derivatives. A typical example is a
stock option. This involves a contract between two
parties that allows you, the buyer, to purchase a
particular stock at a future time from the seller
at a specified price called the "strike
price"—which is often the price of the stock
itself when you buy the option.
Until that future time, you do not own the
stock itself, only the option to buy it. If, when
you do buy it, the value of the stock has gone up,
you will be "in the money." If it has gone down,
you will be "out of the money"—that is, out the
cost of the option.*
The question is: what should be the price of
the option when you buy it? This is what the
Black-
Scholes equation purports to compute. To see
what is involved, I will, following Norstad,
consider a "toy" model—i.e., one that illustrates
many of the general features of the problem
without the mathematical complexity. I can then
tell you some of what you would have to include
for the full-blown Black-Scholes model.
In the toy model, there is a stock whose
current value is $100—the strike price. What makes
the model a toy is that, at the time the option is
to be exercised, there will be only two possible
prices: $120 and $80. (In the real world, there
will of course be a continuum of prices.) Also,
the kind of option I am considering here is known
as a "European call option"—it can only be
exercised at one definite time in the future,
whereas an "American call option" can be exercised
at any time. (I have no idea where these terms
come from.) Finally, I will assume that the
probability of the stock’s rising to $120 is ¾
while the probability of its falling to $80 is ¼.
What should you be willing to pay for the
option? At first sight this seems simple enough.
With the specified probabilities, the expected
outcome is (¾ x $20) + (¼ x $0), or $15. Thus, the
option on the $100 stock should be worth $15 to
you, and you can expect to earn another $5 if you
buy it.
Not so fast, however. This would be true if the
seller were not engaging in financial
engineering—an activity that goes under the
general heading of arbitrage. With
arbitrage, one can gain a certain profit and incur
no risk at all. Not only that, but the cost of the
arbitrage itself is what determines the cost of
the option. This changes everything—and explains
why the financial institutions were hiring quants
by the carload.
Here is how arbitrage works in the case we have
been examining. Assume again that you are the
buyer, and assume that I am the seller. Now assume
that a friendly bank is willing to lend me money
interest-free. (To see how interest payments would
modify the results, look at Norstad’s website.)
Assume finally that I can buy fractional shares of
the $100 stock itself from a friendly broker,
commission-free. By means of these assumptions, to
use another term of art, we have made the problem
"frictionless."
Now suppose you have calculated the expected
outcomes according to the formula presented above
and are willing to give me $15 to buy the option.
I will now show how, no matter what the real
outcome might be, I can always come away with $5
for myself.
It works like this. I take your $15 and put $5
of it in my pocket; you will never see it again.
Then I borrow $40 from my friendly bank as
"leverage." Next, with your $10 and the borrowed
$40, I buy a half-share of the stock. This is
called the "hedge." It has now cost me $10 to
replicate the option, and this will turn out to be
its true value.
How so? If the final price is $120, you will
exercise your option and ask me to buy the stock
for you at $100. What I will then do is to sell my
half-share for $60, repay the bank its $40, and
add the remaining $20 to the $100 you have given
me to buy the share at its current price, which is
the price you agreed to pay. I have not lost on
the run-up in the price of the stock, and I have
still pocketed the $5.
If, on the other hand, the final price is $80,
you will not exercise your option and you will be
out your $15. I, however, will sell my half-share
for $40, which I will then return to the bank,
again still pocketing the $5.
What all this amounts to is that if you have
given me $15 for the option, you have overpaid by
$5. If you think about it, the $10 price is a kind
of tipping point, an "equilibrium price" at which
it is not profitable for me either to buy or to
sell. If I can sell the option for more
than $10, I will make money; if someone wants to
sell me the option for less than $10, I
will buy it and again make money. And that is how
Black and Scholes approached the problem of option
evaluation using arbitrage: find the price at
which there is equilibrium between buying and
selling.
What about Merton and his different approach,
which as it happens is the one that is now more
generally used? To understand that approach, note
that in finding the correct option price in the
presence of arbitrage, the probabilities ¾ and ¼,
which we used earlier to compute our expected
gain, played no role. In real life, indeed, there
is little likelihood that we would ever be given
these probabilities in any reliable way. Even the
presence of a buyer is in an important sense
irrelevant.
To see why that is so, suppose you constructed
a portfolio that consisted of $10 plus a $40 loan
from a friendly bank, which you then invested in a
half-share of the stock. This is called a
"synthetic option." If you were to sell this stock
at the time when its value was either $120 or $80,
the amount you would gain or lose would be the
same as the gain or loss in the preceding example
where the buyer paid $10 for the option to
buy at a future time. The essence of Merton’s
approach is to show that one can, in general,
construct synthetic options that cost the same as
real options and that have the same outcomes. This
is what these brokerage firms do—they construct
synthetic options.
Whatever the difference in their approach,
Black, Scholes, and Merton all had to confront the
fact that in the real world, unlike in our toy
model, we do not have just two future prices but a
continuum. This gets us into the question of how
you can predict the future of a stock price. Black
and Scholes adopted a model according to which
stock prices follow a "random walk," also known as
a "drunkard’s walk."
Let us stipulate that a drunkard begins his
walk at a lamppost and that, with each step, he
can go two feet in a totally random direction. How
far away from the lamppost, on average, will the
drunkard get after a given number of steps? Many
people would say nowhere, since he could end up
going in circles. But on average that is not the
case: the path may appear jagged, but the distance
from the lamppost continually increases. Indeed,
the average distance will increase as the square
root of the number of steps (or, technically
speaking, the square root of the average of the
square of the distance).
This drunkard’s walk is itself an example of
"Brownian motion," where the square-root feature
generally shows up. The phenomenon is named after
the discovery in 1827 by the Scottish botanist
Robert Brown that microscopic pollen grains
suspended in water execute a curious dancing
motion. Here the "drunkard" is a pollen, driven
hither and yon (as was later understood) by its
collisions with invisible water molecules. The
distance traveled by the pollen, Albert Einstein
showed in 1905, is proportional to the square root
of the time during which it is observed.
Assuming that stock prices follow a continuous
random walk, Black and Scholes could make a
prediction for the future distribution of the
price of a stock. (Specifically, they analyzed the
logarithm of the price.) In his book, Derman
provides a graph plotting this distribution. The
prices form a kind of wedge on the graph, with the
pointed end at the initial price and the wedge
continually widening as time goes by and the price
becomes more and more uncertain. Knowing a stock’s
probable future prices, Black and Scholes were
then able to derive an equation for the value of
the option at any given moment. It is a
differential equation, involving the sort of
derivatives that I mistakenly thought Scholes was
learning about when I met him.
Since the value of the stock is constantly
changing—unlike in our toy example, where the
value changes only once—the hedge must also be
constantly adjusted. Generally, the price of the
option will be the total price of this constantly
adjusted hedge. That is the price that people who
sell these options have to compute.
Most equations of this kind have no simple
solutions, but remarkably Black and Scholes found
an exact one. What made their job easier was the
fact that, suitably transformed, their equation is
a familiar one in physics. It arises in the
diffusion of heat, which takes place as hot
molecules randomly collide with colder ones,
giving up some of their energy; eventually, the
two groups of molecules reach a common
temperature. Since heat diffusion has been studied
for well over a century, there are a lot of
mathematical tools available.
Nevertheless, to me as a physicist, the
Black-Scholes model is quite odd. All physical
theories are models. Quantum electrodynamics, for
example, which is the most precise theory ever
created, operates in a model universe that
contains only electrons and quanta of
light-photons. The rest of the real universe, with
its neutrons, protons, mesons, and the like, is
ignored. The object of this model, like all other
models in physics, is to predict the future. If
the model is correct, then the numbers and curves
one calculates with it will be confirmed by
experiment. If not, the model is incorrect.
But the Black-Scholes model is quite different.
It uses a model of the future to describe
the present. In the absence of this model,
or some equivalent of it, present stock options
have no reasonable assigned value. What then is
the test of the model? Presumably, it is that if
one uses it as a guide to buy these options and,
as a result, goes broke, one will be inclined to
re-examine the assumptions.
Presumably.
III
Markets can remain irrational longer than you
can remain solvent.
—John Maynard
Keynes
When Derman came to Goldman Sachs in 1985, the
use of the Black-Scholes equation to evaluate
options had become commonplace. It had gotten off
to a somewhat rocky start. In 1968, Scholes became
an assistant professor of finance at MIT; Black
was a consultant for the Arthur D. Little company
in Cambridge. The two of them began collaborating
on various economics problems. At MIT there was
also Paul Samuelson, one of the creators of modern
mathematical economics. Samuelson had studied the
use of Brownian motion to predict stock prices,
and two of his own students had written theses
attempting thereby to derive values for options.
But it was left to Black and Scholes to finish the
job.
They first derived their equation in 1969,
submitting the results a year later to the
Journal of Political Economy. The paper was
rejected. Next they tried the Review of
Economics and Statistics, which also turned it
down. Revising and simplifying, they sent it back
to the Journal of Political Economy, which
finally published it in the May/June 1973 number
under the title, "Pricing of Options and Corporate
Liabilities." Merton published his own, somewhat
more general paper, "Theory of Rational Option
Pricing," in the Bell Journal of Economics and
Management Science at about the same time.
These turned out to be two of the most influential
papers ever published in economic theory.
The original work was done on stock options. By
the 1980’s, the problem had become how to extend
it to bond options. At Goldman, the first attempt
involved using the Black-Scholes equation, but by
the time Derman came to the firm it was understood
that this had limited validity. In the first
place, future bond prices follow a different curve
from future stock prices because of the fact that
at the expiration date, the bond price returns to
par (its initial offering price). Thus, the spread
of future bond prices has a banana-like shape
rather than a wedge.
In the second place, bond prices tend to be
connected to each other. Familiar examples are
Treasury bonds of different durations. Their
prices tend to move in concert. This does not
happen with stocks, whose prices vary
independently.
The first problem could be dealt with by
focusing on the yield: the average annual
percentage return of the bond if purchased at its
present price and then held to maturity. But the
problem of the interconnection of bonds was much
more serious. And this is where Fischer Black
enters Derman’s story. Black, who had joined
Goldman in 1984, invited Derman to collaborate
with him and another quant named Bill Toy to make
a new model for pricing bond options that would
take these interconnections into account.
Fischer Black is certainly the hero of Derman’s
book. He sounds like a wonderful man. Having money
was never one of his major interests: he liked to
point with pride to the fact that, of all
Goldman’s partners, he had the fewest shares in
the firm. He was also one of the first academics
to be hired on Wall Street, having been brought in
by Robert Rubin, then Goldman’s chairman. His
great strength was his lucidity. He did not like
clutter—mental or otherwise. Derman found that if
he had a specific question, Black was very ready
to try to answer it, but otherwise he was not very
responsive.
By 1986, Black, Derman, and Toy had created a
bond-option model that seemed to work. To make the
model useful to traders, there had to be a
computer program enabling them to estimate rapidly
the price of the bond options they were selling,
and one of the things Derman was able to bring to
the collaboration was the skill at computer
programming that he had acquired at Bell Labs.
They created such a program, but because of
Black’s fastidiousness it took almost four years
before a paper that he considered satisfactory
could be published. Thanks to its simplicity and
accessibility to traders, the BDT model, as it
would be known, became widely used in the
industry.
In 1988, after he had been at Goldman for a
relatively short time, Derman decided that he
needed a change of scene. He interviewed at
Salomon Brothers, where eventually he took a job
for a very unhappy year, after which he returned
to Goldman. Of the groups at Salomon that he
interviewed with, one, hand-picked by John
Meriwether, enjoyed the reputation of being the
savviest derivative traders on Wall Street. Derman
did not get the job.
This was probably fortunate. Ten years later,
this same group precipitated a crisis that led to
a near-total meltdown of the world’s financial
markets.
IV
In reading about this near meltdown—Roger
Lowenstein’s book When Genius Failed (2000)
is an excellent source—I have been struck by the
difference between it and the other financial
scandals that we are now familiar with: Enron,
Global Crossing, and the rest.
For one thing, there is the matter of scale:
while the Enron scandal was a financial disaster
for a large number of people, it was never a
threat to the system as a whole. For another,
there is the matter of intent: many of the people
involved in these scandals have ended up in jail
for participating in criminal activities. But for
those involved in Long Term Capital Management
(LTCM), which is what Meriwether’s hedge fund was
called, there was no criminal intent.
I am not even sure how interested in money the
members of this group were, except as a measure of
their smartness. The investment genius Bernie
Cornfeld used to ask prospective employees of
International Overseas Services—another financial
disaster—"Do you sincerely want to be rich?" By
this he meant: would you sell your sister? Had
Meriwether’s gang been asked this question, I
think they might have had some difficulty
answering.
Not long after Meriwether started his fund in
1993, he successfully recruited both Merton and
Scholes. In his 1997 Nobel Prize autobiography,
written a year before the final catastrophe,
Merton was euphoric about the fund:
The distinctive LTCM experience from
the beginning to the present characterizes the
theme of productive interaction of finance
theory and finance practice. Indeed, in a twist
on the more familiar version of that theme, the
major investment magazine, Institutional
Investor, characterized the remarkable
collection of people at LTCM as "the best
financial faculty in the world."
One wonders what the Nobel committee made of
this, to say nothing of what they, and the editors
of Institutional Investor, would make of it
the following year when the "best financial
faculty in the world" came close to wrecking the
entire world’s financial infrastructure.
The "dean" of this dream faculty, John
Meriwether, was born into a middle-class Catholic
family in Chicago in 1947. Educated in very strict
parochial schools, he was a good student but not
exceptional. He was, however, an extremely good
golfer, and while working at the Flossmor Country
Club he was selected for a college scholarship
awarded only to caddies. He chose to attend
Northwestern and then the University of Chicago to
study business. One of his classmates at Chicago
was Jon Corzine, now a Senator, who as CEO of
Goldman became involved in the LTCM denouement.
In 1973, Meriwether went to work at Salomon.
This was just before the explosion in derivative
trading. In 1977, he began assembling the
arbitrage group at Salomon, the same people with
whom Derman had his unsuccessful interview and who
later formed the core of LTCM.
In assembling his group, Meriwether sought
people from anywhere who were smarter than anyone
else—smarter even than he was. He had no complexes
about this, and no problem in seeking misfits from
academia so long as they were brilliant. These
people, who were characterized by another Salomon
trader as "a bunch of guys who would be playing
with their slide rules at Bell Labs" if they had
not been tapped by Meriwether, loved the
financial-engineering models. They saw in the
market a universe of inefficiency—a salad of
incorrectly priced derivatives that they could
gobble up while waiting for what they were certain
would be the market’s return to efficiency, at
which point they would make a killing.
For several years, Meriwether’s group thrived
and Meriwether became richer and richer, investing
in thoroughbred horses but remaining the rather
unassuming parochial schoolboy he had been. There
was nothing in his group, then or later, that
remotely resembled the sort of partying that
Bernie Cornfeld was famous for in Geneva.
Meriwether’s very tightknit group played liar’s
poker or golf together; what they did not do was
to explain to outsiders anything about their
trading. Banks and brokerage houses put in
millions and millions without having any real idea
of how the money was being invested. All that
mattered to them was that out of the black box,
vast returns kept appearing.
Here is a little analogy that may be useful in
understanding the denouement. A scheme guarantees
that I will win $1,000 at the roulette wheel in
Monte Carlo. I will bet $1,000 on red. If it comes
up red, I will collect. If it comes up black, I
will bet $2,000 on the next turn of the wheel. If
it comes up black again, I will double my bet. And
so on. Unless the wheel is crooked, it must sooner
or later come up red, and I will win my
$1,000.
But there are limits. If, for example, the
wheel comes up black ten times in a row, my next
bet will run into the millions. What then? Once I
start the game I cannot stop, unless I either hit
red or am prepared to pay off the last bet.
Perhaps I can persuade a bank to lend me the
money—the leverage—to keep going. But if not,
Keynes’s maxim about the irrationality of the
markets will have come true. The bank may want its
money back, or the casino may decide that I have
reached my limit and it will no longer accept a
bet from me.
Either of these situations is potentially
catastrophic, and both of them, in a manner of
speaking, came to apply to LTCM. The key to
everything was the assumption that the market
would behave rationally—the same continuity of
behavior that was one of the assumptions behind
the Black-Scholes formula. For if the drunk on his
random walk were suddenly to fall down a manhole,
all bets would be off.
In late summer 1998, the fund had $3.6 billion
in capital, which made this unknown firm in
Greenwich, Connecticut a larger financial
enterprise than any of the major brokerage houses
on Wall Street. But during a five-week period in
August and September they lost it all. They were
wiped out. The "faculty" sustained personal losses
of $1.9 billion.
To get a flavor of the catastrophe, consider
again our toy model. The model is a toy because
there are only two outcomes for the stock—$120 or
$80. The difference between these numbers—the
spread—is a measure of the risk, reflected in the
amount that the hedge will cost us. In our example
it was $10—the price of the option. But suppose we
widen the spread to $140 and $60, or $80. If we do
the algebra, we will find that the cost of the
hedge has risen to $13.33.
In the real world, where we do not have only
two outcomes, we must have some theory of future
volatility. This is what LTCM thought it had. Its
traders looked for stocks whose volatility, in
their view, had been overestimated. Japan was a
good source, which is why the firm opened an
office in Tokyo. Owners of these stocks were ready
to pay LTCM a premium to create a hedge. They were
betting that, just as the roulette wheel has to
come up red, in the course of time the market
would behave rationally and the volatility—the
spread—would relax to the predicted value. (As
opposed to "real arbitrage," which occurs when two
identical commodities have been priced
differently, so that the two prices must
converge, this sort of guessing, or hoping for
convergence, is known as "statistical arbitrage.")
But there was an additional element. LTCM was
not playing the game with its own money. It was
playing with borrowed money. Taking advantage of
the very loose regulation at the time—Alan
Greenspan thought, and still thinks, that hedge
funds should not be regulated at all—LTCM was able
to give borrowed money to banks, which would then
set up accounts, or "swaps," mirroring in terms of
profits and loss the stock that LTCM wanted to
buy. There was no limit on this, and banks were
just shoveling money at the firm.
By the spring of 1998 it was already becoming
unglued. Instead of narrowing, the spreads were
becoming wider. This meant that LTCM had lost its
bet on the option cost. It had also begun to make
investments directly in stocks, and these were
also losing money. Markets around the world were
sinking. In August, Russia defaulted on its
external debts, causing further chaos. Everyone
was looking for liquidity, and LTCM, with its huge
positions, could not unload. To add to everything,
it had an arrangement with the firm of Bear
Stearns, which acted as its broker of record on
the understanding that it would stop carrying out
transactions if the reserve it held from LTCM—its
"cash in the box"—fell below $500 million. This
was money based on LTCM’s assets, which were
rapidly melting away, which meant that the
roulette wheel might stop, putting LTCM out of
business.
Meriwether tried without success to borrow
money from everyone he knew, including Warren
Buffet and George Soros. But by the middle of
September it was clear that without outside help
the company would collapse and that, because of
its intertwining relationships with banks and
brokerages both here and abroad, the market itself
might collapse. By the end of September, in a
much-criticized move, the Federal Reserve
orchestrated a rescue in which fourteen banks
provided $3.65 billion to take over the fund. Long
Term Capital Management was through.
Despite their losses, the partners came out of
this debacle as wealthy men. Nor did their
professional lives seem to have been destroyed.
Merton is now a professor at the Harvard Business
School. Scholes is a partner in a firm in Menlo
Park called Oak Hill Capital Management.
Meriwether, hardly missing a beat, started a new
firm called JWM Partners, the roster of whose
associates includes several names familiar from
LTCM.
As for financial engineering, to judge by
Derman’s courses at Columbia, where he now runs
the financial-engineering program, it too is
thriving. And Black-Scholes-Merton? So far as I
know, its reputation still rides high. All in all,
I cannot help thinking of Albert Einstein’s reply
when asked what he would say if experiments failed
to confirm his theory of gravitation. "Then I
would have felt sorry for the dear Lord," Einstein
responded. "The theory is correct."
JEREMY BERNSTEIN is the author most recently
of Oppenheimer: Portrait of an Enigma (Ivan
Dee). His books include Cranks, Quarks, and
the Cosmos, Albert Einstein, and Quantum
Profiles.
* Wiley, 288 pp., $29.95.
† I wrote a series of linked profiles of some
of these physicists that was published as a book
in 1984, Three Degrees Above Zero.
* This is actually a "call" option. One can
also buy a "put," in which you have the option to
sell the stock at the strike price. In a
put option, you would normally want the stock to
fall, since you can then sell it for more than it
is worth. A theorem demonstrates that, for a given
stock, and under the conditions where the
Black-Scholes equation is valid, the values of a
put option and a call option are related. This is
called the "put-call parity
theorem."